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ABSTRACT   
By setting up a simple Romer-type (1989) endogenous growth model embodying a political trade union 
(rather than the traditional economic labor union), this paper explores the effects of unionization on 
unemployment, growth and welfare by highlighting the essence of internal conflict within the union.  
It is shown that the conflicting interests between the leadership and membership within the union play a 
decisive role in the unemployment, growth and welfare effects of unionization.  Given the fact that 
taxation, besides unions, is another potential candidate in explaining the poor performance of 
employment and economic growth, we re-examine the taxation effects within the growth model with 
equilibrium unemployment caused by the presence of the trade union and compare our findings with 
those for the traditional full-employment growth model.  In addition, the dynamic properties of the 
unionized economy are also examined, with particular emphasis being placed on the role of the trade 
union in the formation of equilibrium indeterminacy.     
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A “Managerial” Trade Union and Economic Growth 
1. Introduction   
While unemployment and economic growth are two central issues in macroeconomics, 
and a large number of studies have been devoted to each of them, few papers have jointly 
studied them, and most have discussed them independently of each other.  The main reason 
for this dichotomy is that unemployment is usually viewed as a pure business cycle 
phenomenon that will disappear in the long run, whereas economic growth is definitely seen as 
a long-term trend.  In recent years, economists have increasingly suggested that this 
dichotomy between unemployment and growth may be too sharp.    As stressed by Bean (1994) 
and Daveri and Tabellini (2000), a large part of the existing unemployment, particularly in 
Europe, may be attributed to equilibrium unemployment.    With this understanding, Bean and 
Pissarides (1993), Aghion and Howitt (1994), and Bräuninger (2000), among others, have 
investigated the relationship between unemployment and growth in a growing economy with 
equilibrium  unemployment.   
A popular explanation for equilibrium unemployment is that it arises due to the collective 
bargaining that takes place between unions and employers.    Indeed, in practice, labor markets 
in most economies are far from being perfectly competitive.  There is no doubt that trade 
unions play an important role in many countries and union wage bargaining is the common 
means of determining wages, especially in continental Europe.  In this paper, we therefore 
build a simple endogenous growth model in which the labor market is dominated by an 
economy-wide trade union.    Since the trade union is able to capture rents and bargain over a 
wage that exceeds the market-clearing level, the growth model that we will set up is 
characterized by equilibrium unemployment.     
The objectives of this study are very simple and can be roughly divided into two parts: (i) 
given a managerial trade union, we explore the effects of unionization (namely, increasing the 
bargaining power of the labor union) on unemployment, economic growth, and social welfare; 
and (ii) within the endogenous growth model characterized by equilibrium unemployment, we 
re-examine the effects of taxation, fully comparing them with those in the traditional 
full-employment growth model.  The first objective is similar to that in several other papers, 
e.g., Palokangas (1996), Irmen and Wigger (2000), Lingens (2002), and Ramos-Parreño and 
Sánchez-Losada (2002).  However, our emphasis is distinctive.  Palokangas (1996) and 
Lingens (2002) shed light on the role of intersectoral interaction and labor mobility in the 
growth effect of unionization, while Irmen and Wigger (2000) and Ramos-Parreño and 
Sánchez-Losada (2002) develop an OLG model that focuses on the role of intergenerational   2
resource allocation and altruism in relation to that same effect.  In departing from their 
analysis, this paper sets up a simple Romer-type (1989) endogenous growth model and uses it 
to explore the effects of unionization on unemployment, growth and welfare by highlighting 
the essence of internal conflict within a political union.   
There was a famous debate between Dunlop and Ross.  Dunlop (1944) argued (as in 
most of the economic literature) that a trade union aimed to rationally maximize “something,” 
say, either a utilitarian objective function or an expected utility function.  This viewpoint, 
which may have been standard in economics, was challenged by Ross (1948).  He claimed 
that trade unions were political institutions in their own right, and that economists’ use of such 
a maximization approach ignored their vital political dimension.  In the Ross sense, the 
behavior of a political trade union should have reflected internal conflicts between different 
factions, especially the leadership and membership, rather than a simple maximization of 
choice.  Pemberton (1988) side-stepped Ross’s point and developed a managerial model 
which could, on the one hand, identify the so-called “something” that Dunlop argued unions 
maximized, as well as, on the other hand, capture the essence of internal conflicts within trade 
unions.  By following Pemberton (1988), the present paper specifies that in a growing 
economy there is a “managerial” trade union, whose policy is influenced by both leadership 
(management) and membership preferences.    Specifically, the leadership desires to strengthen 
the union by building up membership and hence employment (we are easily convinced that the 
leadership is interested in union size, on the basis of the common notion that bureaucrats 
prefer large organizations).  Under such a situation, we can refer to the union’s policy as 
“employment-oriented.”  However, the membership has a conflicting interest in light of this 
and desires to extract higher excess wages from employers.  The “wage-oriented” policy 
implies that the union is more democratic or populist.   
Given such a political trade union, we find that the conflicting interests between the 
leadership and membership within the union play a decisive role in the unemployment, growth 
and welfare effects of unionization.  To be specific, the higher relative bargaining power of 
the union will result in a lower (higher) unemployment rate and a higher (lower) 
balanced-growth rate if the union is employment-oriented (wage-oriented), i.e. the leadership 
(membership) within the union has the dominant power.    If the union is neutral, unionization 
will have no impact on either unemployment or economic growth.  As a consequence, we 
also conclude that a higher degree of unionization will have a positive (negative) effect on 
social welfare if the union is employment-oriented (wage-oriented).   This implies that, 
somewhat surprisingly, when the union is more democratic and more aggressively extracts   3
higher wages from firms, unionization will instead give rise to a negative effect on welfare.     
Besides unions, taxation is another potential candidate for explaining the poor 
performance of employment and economic growth (see, for example, Nickell and Layard, 
1999, and Daveri and Tabellini, 2000).  Perhaps due to the dichotomy we mentioned earlier, 
so far the growth effect of taxation has been explored mostly in the context of competitive 
labor markets that are characterized by full employment.  Therefore, the second aim of this 
paper is to re-examine the taxation effects within the growth model with equilibrium 
unemployment (caused by the presence of the trade union) and compare our findings with 
those related to the traditional full-employment growth model.  This work is important 
because many empirical studies mention that taxes give rise to a distorting effect in terms of 
affecting not only unemployment in the short run but also growth in the long run.     
In the existing literature, endogenous growth models with exogenous labor supply predict 
that a consumption tax does not affect an individual’s incentive to accumulate capital and 
therefore leaves growth unaffected (see, e.g., Rebelo, 1991, for the consumption tax neutrality).   
However, income taxes are harmful to economic growth.  In our endogenous growth model 
with equilibrium unemployment, we show that while income tax is harmful to unemployment 
and economic growth (which is not surprising), in a way that departs from the common 
viewpoint, a consumption tax also gives rise to a negative effect on the employment level and 
the balanced-growth rate.  Of more interest, the negatively distorting effects of taxation, 
including income and consumption taxes, on the balanced-growth rate are more pronounced in 
an economy that is dominated by a powerful trade union, provided that it is 
employment-oriented.  In addition, we find that, in conformity with empirical evidence (see 
Daveri and Tabellini, 2000, and Widmalm, 2001), income taxes will generate more of a 
distorting effect, in terms of unemployment and economic growth, than consumption taxes.     
Recently, many studies, including Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Benhabib and 
Perli (1994), Bond, et al. (1996) and Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), have emphasized the 
role of goods market imperfections in the formation of indeterminate equilibrium paths.  In 
this paper, we instead focus on the role of labor market imperfections caused by trade unions 
in terms of generating indeterminacy.  We show that equilibrium unemployment and 
distortionary taxes jointly create a mechanism that gives rise to equilibrium indeterminacy.  
Bond, et al. (1996) have suggested that the economy could become indeterminate when 
distortionary taxes are imposed on manufacturing entities.  This paper takes a further step to 
point out that the trade union also plays a significant role: Given that the union is 
wage-oriented, the equilibrium of the unionized economy is more likely to become locally   4
indeterminate when the economy is highly unionized.       
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we set up a simple 
endogenous growth model with a managerial trade union in which we lay particular emphasis 
on the essence of internal conflicts between the leadership and membership within the union.  
In Section 3, the dynamic properties of the unionized economy are analyzed.  In Section 4, 
we investigate the effect of unionization on unemployment, growth and welfare, and 
re-examine the effect of taxation within an endogenous growth model characterized by 
equilibrium  unemployment.  Finally,  concluding remarks are provided in Section 5. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider a unionized economy consisting of four types of agents: households, firms, a 
(national) trade union and a government.  To shed light on the role of the trade union in the 
labor market, we assume, for simplicity, that the product market is perfectly competitive.  
The firms produce goods from labor and physical capital through Cobb-Douglas technology.  
An economy-wide trade union engages in centralized bargaining with one economy-wide 
federation, which represents employers.  In contrast to the common “economic” (i.e. 
utilitarian) models of trade unions, we adopt a Ross-type approach in which a union is a 
“political” organization in the sense that its behavior reflects the internal conflict between its 
leadership (or management) and its membership, rather than simply involving a rational 
maximization of choice.  Accordingly, as we will make clearer later, there exists a political 
conflict within the union: the leadership is interested in employment (and hence union size) 
and the membership is more concerned with the excess wage.    Households derive utility from 
consumption and (if employed) provide their labor inelastically to firms.  As in the common 
growth models, the population growth rate is normalized to zero.  Finally, the government 
levies taxes, including an income tax and a consumption tax, to finance the expending of 
unemployment benefits b and, accordingly, balances its budget each period.     
 
2.1 Firms, the trade union, and collective bargaining   
Firms 
Firms hire physical capital k and labor l to produce a single good y which can be 
consumed or invested.  In line with Romer (1989), production is subject to the following 
technology:   
  (,,) () yf k k l A k k l
α β ==,  01 α < < ,  01 β < < , (1) 
where  k  is the average economy-wide stock of capital.  As indicated by Wu and Zhang   5
(1998), the production function (1) exhibits constant returns to scale and is subject to a 
productivity externality, which is captured by  () Ak .  The external effect refers to the 
spillovers of knowledge that operate at the average level of the overall economy and generate 
perpetual growth.  To sustain a growth rate, we further specify that 
1 () Ak Ak
α − =⋅  for 
convenience.   
Given the production technology (1), the representative firm attempts to maximize its 
profit  π  as  follows: 
  yw lr k π =− − , (2) 
where w and r are the wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respectively.   
 
Trade union 
Following Pemberton (1988), we assume that the trade union is a “managerial” one 
whose policies are influenced by both leadership (management) and membership preferences.  
The leadership desires to strengthen the union by building up its membership.    We are easily 
convinced that the leadership is interested in union size (the number of members), based on the 
common notion that bureaucrats prefer large organizations.    Given the assumption of a closed 
shop union, the desire for a higher membership is equivalent to the desire for a higher level of 
employment.
1    However, this conflicts with the membership preference: the median worker is 
interested in the excess wage.  Given the conflict between leadership and membership 
preferences, we specify, in line with Pemberton (1988), that the managerial trade union’s 
objective function has the following Stone-Geary form:
2     
  ˆ ˆ ()
v Uw b l
δ =− . (3) 
In (3), defining τ   as the income tax rate and 
c τ   as the consumption tax rate, 
ˆ (1 ) /(1 ) c ww τ τ ≡− +  and  ˆ /(1 ) c bb τ ≡+  are the after-tax wage rate and unemployment 
benefits in terms of the real variables, respectively.  The parameters  0 δ ≥  and  0 v ≥  
correspond to the excess wage  ˆ ˆ () wb −  and to the employment level l elasticities of the 
union’s objective U.  Following our earlier discussion, v and δ  can be thought of as the 
distribution of the internal power of leadership and membership, respectively.    The larger the 
difference ( v − δ ), the more the union approaches the extreme of a “democratic” (or 
                                                 
1 In the closed shop union, only union members are eligible for employment; hence the level of membership is 
equivalent to the level of employment.     
2 See Pemberton (1988) for detailed derivations.  Such a Stone-Geary utility function of the trade union is also 
supported by the empirical studies of Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981).     6
“populist”) union.  When  v = δ , these two parties have an identical discretionary power in 
formulating policies.  In a strategic trade model, Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) state that 
the union is “wage oriented” if  v > δ , while it is “employment oriented” if  v < δ .   
 
Collective bargaining 
The efficient bargaining model as proposed by McDonald and Solow (1981) has been an 
important framework in the trade union literature.    The central feature of such a model is the 
requirement that the negotiated wage-employment contract should be efficient for both the 
employer and the union.    With this feature, we follow Clark (1990) and assume, without loss 
of generality, that both the union and the employers’ federation bargain over nominal wages 
and employment through the generalized Nash bargaining solution, subject to the firms’ 
demand for capital.  Given that the bargaining disagreement point results in a zero 
employment level, this optimization problem can be expressed as:   
 
l w, max ≡ Ω
1 ˆ ˆ [( ) ] [ ( ) ]
v wbl A k k l w lr k
δ θα β θ − −⋅ − − , 
s.t.  π
k k max arg = , 
where (0,1) θ ∈   is a parameter that denotes the relative bargaining strength of the union. 
By some simple manipulations, the optimal conditions for the wage and employment are 
given by: 
 
1 ˆ ˆ ()
ˆ















− −− ⎡⎤ =+ ⎢⎥ −+ ⎣⎦
, (5) 
and the firm’s capital demand function:   
 
1 () rA k k l
αβ α
− = . (6) 
As in the traditional theory of union bargaining, (4) describes the contract curve in the (w, l) 
space and (5) depicts the rent division curve (see Booth, 1995, for details).  The contract 
curve is upward (downward) sloping if and only if the union is employment (wage) oriented 
v < δ  ( v > δ ).
3  This result obviously differs from the traditional union bargaining theory 
which predicts that if the union is risk-averse (i.e. its preference is characterized by a concave 
utility of income function), the slope of the contract curve is positive; while if it is risk-loving, 
the contract curve turns out to be negatively sloped.  This distinction, as we will see in 
                                                 
3  From (4), we have 
2 (1 ) ( )
0, iff 






− ∂− ≥≥ = < < ∂−
.   7
Section 4, will play a prominent role in our analysis.     
Equation (5) represents the division curve, which is in conformity with the common 
characteristics of the traditional efficient bargaining models.    It follows from (5) that, given a 
particular level of employment, as the union’s bargaining power  θ  increases, the negotiated 
wage rate will be raised.  Equation (6) is a standard  MPK r =  condition.  To simplify the 
analysis and also conform to the standard trade union models, we do not incorporate the 
union’s preference concerning physical capital into its utility function as reported in (3).
4  
Given this simplicity, we can easily realize that the level of k satisfying (6) will be the same as 
that under an efficient wage-employment–capital contract (under which the wage, employment, 
and capital are simultaneously determined from the negotiation between the employers’ 
federation and the trade union).  Clark (1990) and Ulph and Ulph (1990, p. 109) obtain 
similar results.    This allows us to avoid the consequence of inefficiency whereby unionization 
leads to underinvestment.
5   
Because the labor market is characterized by unionization, market imperfection will result 
in a positive profit for firms.  By substituting (4)-(6) into (2), the representative firm’s profit 














Equation (7) indicates that the firm’s profit is positive when (i) the individual firm’s 
production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale in its internal capital and labor 
factors, i.e.  0 1 α β <+< , and (ii) the employers’ federation has a positive bargaining power, 
i.e.  01 θ << .    In the extreme case where  1 = θ , the profit is reduced to zero.   
 
2.2 Households 
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical, infinitely-lived households.  
Each household is endowed with one unit of time and has an instantaneous CRRA utility 
function with respect to consumption c.
6  Accordingly,  the  individual  household  chooses  c so 
                                                 
4 Some researchers, e.g., Clark (1990), introduce the so-called “manning ratio” (by which is meant the 
capital-labor or output-labor ratio) into the negotiation between unions and employers.  See Booth (1995, pp. 
121-122) for details.       
5  Grout (1984) shows that, given that the firm is a monopoly, under “the non-binding contracts” the presence of a 
union will lead to underinvestment if the resale price of capital is less than its purchase price.  Van der Ploeg 
(1987) incorporates the adjustment costs of investment into a dynamic model and finds that unionization may also 
be associated with lower investment.     
6  The case of log-linear utility is excluded to maintain the homogeneity of the preferences.   8
as to maximize the discounted sum of future instantaneous utilities.  Specifically, with an 















− ∫ , (8) 
subject to the following flow budget constraint: 
  (1 )( ) (1 ) (1 ) c kr k w l b l c τ πτ =− ++ + −−+ & , (9) 
and a positive capital endowment  0 0 k > .  The sources of income of a representative 
individual, as shown by (9), consist of capital income rk, labor income wl, and the profits  π  
transferred from firms.    For simplicity and to focus our point, the same income tax rate  τ  is 
imposed on all types of income.  It is worth noting that in a unionized economy, the labor 
market may be characterized by an equilibrium unemployment rate, say,  l − 1 .  When the 
worker is unemployed, he will receive unemployment benefits b from the government.  
However, to avoid an unnecessarily complicated derivation, we follow van der Ploeg (1987), 
Palokangas (1996), and Lingens (2002) and assume that the number of households is 
continuous and infinite.  Therefore,  ) 1 ( l b wl − +  can be thought of as the “average” labor 
income of an individual household.     














c γ  be the maximum sustainable rate of consumption growth.  To ensure that the 
lifetime utility is bounded, we impose the Brock-Gale condition as follows: 
 
Condition B: 
max (1 ) c ρ σγ >− . 
 
2.3 The government and the resource constraint 
The government collects taxes, including income taxes  ) ( wl rk + +π τ  and consumption 
taxes  c c τ , to finance the expending of unemployment benefits  ) 1 ( l b − .  Accordingly,  at  any 
instant of time, the government budget constraint can be expressed as: 
(1 ) ( ) c b l rk wl c τ πτ −= ++ + , (11) 
By adjusting b, the government balances its budget (11) each period.     
Putting the government’s budget constraint (11), the household’s budget constraint (9), 
the firm’s production function (1) and the profit function (4) together yields the aggregate 
resource constraint of the economy:   9
  () kA k k l c
αβ =− & = c y− . (12) 
 
2.4 Equilibrium 
In equilibrium, all firms make the same choices, so that  kk =  applies.  Equipped  with 
this, we rewrite (4)-(6), (10), (11) and (12) and, accordingly, summarize the equilibrium 








= , (4a) 
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β =− & , (12a) 













3. Stability Analysis 
For ease of derivation, we combine (4a) with (5a) and, as a result, obtain the 
unemployment benefit-wage ratio: 
  (1 )
b
w















≡ , we next substitute (5a) and (13) into 
(11a) to solve employment l for the instantaneous relationship as follows: 
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0 < . 
Substituting (6a) and (14) into the Keynes-Ramsey rule (10) and the aggregate resource   10



















To obtain an endogenous growth rate, we should further use (15) and (16) to transform the 











where ( ; , , ) c ll x θ ττ =  reported  in  (14).   
We now in turn deal with the problem of the existence and uniqueness of the 
balanced-growth-path equilibrium.    Based on (17), we establish the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1.    There exists a unique balanced growth equilibrium in the unionized economy. 
Proof: At the steady-growth equilibrium, the economy is characterized by  0 x = &  and  x is at its 




(;,, ) c xA l x




=− % %% . (18) 
Figure 1 provides a geometric illustration for the identification of equilibrium.  Define the 
RHS of (18) as a function  () gx % .  As shown in Figure 1,  () gx %  is a monotonic function in 
x ~ due to  (0,1) β ∈ , though it may be either upward or downward sloping.  Given that, the 
fixed point theorem immediately leads to a stationary  x %   that exists and is unique.     
Based on (18), we can further solve the steady state employment  l%  and the common 
balanced-growth rate  γ%  from (14) and (15): 
  ((,, ) ;,, ) (,, ) cc c ll x l θ ττ θττ θττ == %% %  (19) 






=== − % %%% , (20) 
that are also unique.  
Recently, many studies, including Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Benhabib and 
Perli (1994), Bond, et al. (1996), and Benhabib and Nishimura (1998), have emphasized the 
role of goods market imperfections in the formation of the indeterminacy of equilibrium paths.   
This issue is important since, as argued by Boldrin and Rustichini (1994, p. 324), “if the 
indeterminacy is present, the interpretation of many simple estimations, obtained by polling   11
together data from a variety of different countries, can be questioned as there is no reason to 
believe that these countries should be moving along the same equilibrium path.”    Accordingly, 
it also gives an implication for the generation of business fluctuations (Benhabib and Farmer, 
1994).  
Following this line of research, we turn to the discussion of the local stability property of 
this macro equilibrium, particularly the effect of unionization upon it.  Such a study lets us 
understand whether the trade union generates multiple transitional paths so that it would 
amplify business fluctuation.    According to (17), we have the following proposition:   
 
Proposition 1.    Define  = D
1 (1 )





+ % .  If  0 D > , the equilibrium is locally 
determinate.  However, if  0 D < , then local indeterminacy emerges in the unionized 
economy.   







% ,  
where 
1 (1 )




− −− > ≡+ <










∆ % 0 < .  Given that x is a jump 
variable, the dynamic equilibrium will be locally determinate if  0 D > .  However,  if  0 D < , 
there exists a continuum of equilibrium trajectories that converges to the steady state and, 
accordingly, local indeterminacy emerges in the economy.  
To make the result more specific and for ease of illustration, we substitute  x l  into  D and 
rewrite the resulting equation as: 
  (1 ) 1
(1 ) (1 ) 0 c Dl
l
βσ τ α β
τ τ τη τη
σβ
⎧⎫ −− − ⎡⎤ > ≡+ + − + − ⎨⎬ < ⎢⎥ ∆ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
%
% .  
Based on the above equation, Proposition 1 contributes new insights to the existing literature 
on equilibrium indeterminacy.    First, if the economy is characterized by full employment, i.e. 
1 l = %  (and hence  0 =
x l ), and if distortionary taxes are abstracted from the analysis, i.e. 
0 = =
c τ τ ,  0 D >  then holds.  This implies that the dynamic equilibrium is locally 
determinate.    However, when equilibrium unemployment ( 1 l < % ) and distortionary taxes play 
roles, the property of the economy’s equilibrium becomes more complicated and there may be 
local indeterminacy.    From the above equation, we learn that local indeterminacy emerges iff: 
11 1 1
(1 ) 1




τ ττ η φ
στ α τ β θττ
⎧⎫ ⎡⎤ − ⎪⎪ >+ + − + ≡ ⎨⎬ ⎢⎥ − ⎪⎪ ⎣⎦ ⎩⎭
% ,   12
implying, similar to Benhabib and Perli (1994), that a higher intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (1/σ ) may lead the equilibrium to become indeterminate.  However, from the 
above condition we find that the strength of the union’s bargaining power also plays a 










⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ∂− ≥ =+ − ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ < ∂−⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
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−− − ≥ = < −+
;  iff v δ ≥
<  and  1( / ){ [ 1( 1 )/] c ll θθ η ητ α σ β τ τ β − =− − ++ %%  
() 1( 1 / ) } / 0 lD τη β β −+ − ∆ > % .  This indicates that the equilibrium of the unionized 
economy is more likely to become locally indeterminate when the union is powerful (i.e. 
0 / < ∂ ∂ θ φ ) provided that it is wage oriented, i.e.  v > δ .    A straightforward (though possibly 
rough) reason for this is that, as we will see in Proposition 2, when the union is wage oriented, 
unionization will give rise to a bigger distorting effect in terms of the reduction in employment, 
which will result in a slowdown of growth.
7  This will highlight the roles of unemployment 
and taxes in the formation of local indeterminacy.
8     
 
4. Unemployment, Growth and Welfare Effects   
We are now ready to explore the employment, growth, and welfare effects of unionization, 
namely, an increase in the union’s bargaining power θ .  Under Lemma 1 and the local 
determinacy condition  0 D > , we begin our analysis by rewriting the steady-state 
consumption-capital ratio (stated in (18)) in terms of a reduced form as follows: 
 
?? (,, ) c x θ ττ
−
% , (21) 
where 
1 (1 )







− −− ≥ =− <
% % ;  iff v δ ≥
< , 
1 (1 )
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%% % , 
1 (1 )
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−− −−− ≥ = < −+ ∆
%
;  iff v δ ≥
< .  
 
4.1 The unemployment and growth effects of union power 
                                                 
7 In a labor matching model, Rocheteau (1999) shows how balanced budgets can render the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment  indeterminate.   
8  Benhabib and Perli (1994), Mino (1999), and Itaya and Mino (2003) show that by allowing for endogenous 
labor choice, indeterminacy is easily produced.  See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for excellent and detailed 
discussions.    13
Based on (21), the following interesting proposition can be established:   
 
Proposition 2.  Under Lemma 1 and given that the equilibrium is locally determinate 
0 D > , a higher relative bargaining power  θ   will result in a lower (higher) unemployment 
rate and a higher (lower) balanced-growth rate if the union is employment oriented  δ > v  
(wage oriented  δ < v ), i.e. the leadership (membership) within the union has dominant 
power.  When the union is neutral  δ = v , unionization has no impact on either 
unemployment or economic growth.     
Proof:    By substituting (21) into (14) and (20), we immediately have: 
  2
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− ∂− ≥ = < ∂
% %% , iff  v δ ≥
< . (23)   
Proposition 2 provides intuitive but interesting comparative statics.  When the union is 
employment oriented, an increase in its bargaining power will result in not only a higher 
negotiated wage rate but also a higher level of employment (recalling that, when the union is 
employment oriented, an upward-sloping contract curve guarantees a positive relationship 
between wages and the employment level).  As a result, the unemployment rate  ) 1 ( l −  will 
fall.  The main reason for this is that an employment-oriented union will more aggressively 
force the firms to hire more workers.  Given that under the Cobb-Douglas production 
technology labor and capital are technical complements, (6a) indicates that a higher level of 
employment will increase the productivity of capital and hence the interest rate.  Therefore, 
the economic growth rate will increase in response to a higher bargaining power of the union.   
On the contrary, a wage-oriented union will be more aggressive in extracting the excess wage 
for its members.    In exchange for a higher bargained wage, it will be willing to incur a loss in 
terms of the reduction in employment (note that the wage is negatively correlated with 
employment when the union is wage oriented).    Once the unemployment rate rises, the rate of 
economic growth will also fall in response.  In other words, when the union is more 
democratic, unionization is more likely to result in an increase in unemployment and a 
slowdown  in  growth.    
Proposition 2 contributes to an important macro implication: Unionization will not 
necessarily be bad for unemployment and growth, but rather, when contrasted with the 
common notion, may not only alleviate the short-run (or medium-term) problem of 
unemployment, but may also speed up the long-run economic growth.  In the endogenous   14
growth context where there are two goods markets (the final and R&D sectors) and two labor 
sectors (the skilled and unskilled sectors), Palokangas (1996) also provides an example to 
propound the possibly positive relationship between unionization and economic growth.  He 
shows that, given that skilled and unskilled workers are complements in the final-goods sector 
and that the R&D sector employs only skilled labor, unionization in the unskilled labor market 
will increase the wages of unskilled labor and decrease their employment, and this will in turn 
decrease the demand for skilled workers (due to the complementary relationship between 
skilled and unskilled workers).  This fall in the demand for skilled labor will decrease the 
wage for skilled labor and, consequently, will reduce the firm’s R&D costs.    Accordingly, the 
production of new designs will speed up the rate of economic growth. 
Irmen and Wigger (2000) develop an OLG model with a trade union, in which they 
demonstrate that if a union formed by the working young succeeds in raising the aggregate 
wage bill and effectively transfers resources from the dissaving old to the saving young, 
unionization may lead to higher aggregate savings and per capita income growth.  A similar 
result is found by Ramos-Parreño and Sánchez-Losada (2000) who use a two-sector OLG 
model with intergenerational altruism and unions.  In a way that differs from theirs, we 
abstract the interaction between sectors and the allocation of resources between generations 
from our analysis and show that the nature of internal conflict within a political union is 
sufficient to create a mechanism resulting in a positive relationship between unionization and 
economic growth. 
Endogenous growth models with exogenous labor supply predict that a consumption tax 
does not affect an individual’s incentives to accumulate capital and therefore leaves growth 
unaffected (see, e.g., Rebelo, 1991, for the consumption tax neutrality).    Income taxes, on the 
other hand, are harmful to economic growth.  However, so far, the growth effect of taxation 
has only been investigated in the context of a competitive labor market.    Therefore, it is also 
interesting to re-examine the effects of taxation on both unemployment and economic growth 
in the unionized economy with equilibrium  unemployment.   
 
Proposition 3.    Under Lemma 1 and the local determinacy condition  0 D > ,  
(i)  A higher income tax rate is harmful to unemployment and economic growth; 
(ii) An increase in the consumption tax rate increases unemployment and decreases the 
balanced-growth rate.   
Proof:  Substituting  (21)  into  (14) and (20) immediately yields: 
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Even though the labor market is characterized by equilibrium unemployment, result (i) of 
Proposition 3 is still consistent with the common argument in endogenous growth models with 
full employment.  Result (ii) of Proposition 3, however, is different from the traditional 
viewpoint whereby the consumption tax has no impact on the balanced-growth rate.  As is 
evident from Proposition 3, if we ignore the unemployment effect (hence  0 = =
c l l τ τ ), 
Proposition 3 will be reduced to the traditional results, i.e.  /0 γ τ ∂ ∂< %  and  / 0 c γ τ ∂∂= % .  
However, if the unemployment effect is taken into account, increasing the consumption tax 
will give rise to an additionally negative effect on the employment level and this will 
deteriorate the marginal productivity of capital.    Consequently, the economic growth rate will 
fall.
9  
It follows from Proposition 3 that we have two interesting corollaries.  First of all, 
comparing the relative effect between the income tax and the consumption tax on both 
unemployment and economic growth leads to: 
 
Corollary 1.   Income taxes give rise to a more distorting effect, in terms of unemployment 
and economic growth, than consumption taxes.     
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The finding in Corollary 1 is supported by the observation of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for 
continental Europe.    Intuitively, given that no tax is imposed on the unemployment benefit b, 
a higher wage income tax will drive a wedge between income if employed and income if 
                                                 
9 Brief discussions concerning the effects of taxation in models of endogenous labor supply are provided by 
Devereux and Love (1994), Stocky and Rebelo (1995), Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini (1998), and Turnovsky (2000).   
They conclude that an increase in the tax on consumption leads to a decrease in the supply of labor, resulting in a 
substitution of leisure for labor, and further leads to a reduction in the growth rate.     16
unemployed, as indicated by (3).  This distortion leads the trade union to become more 
concerned about the negotiated wage rate and induces it to accept a lower level of employment 
in exchange for a higher excess wage.  As a result, unemployment follows and economic 
growth slows down.  However, by referring to (3), we learn that taxes on consumption 
generate an overall impact on consumers regardless of whether they are employed or 
unemployed workers.  Consequently, the distorting effect caused by the consumption taxes 
becomes smaller.  Due to the distinction between income and consumption taxes, income 
taxes have a greater negative impact effect on unemployment and growth.  This result 
potentially suggests that there may be benefits in reforming the tax structure by shifting the 
burden of taxation away from labor income onto consumption.     
Another interesting question is whether the distorting effects of taxation on economic 
growth are more pronounced in a labor market that is dominated by a powerful trade union.  
Corollary 2 that follows is established in order to answer this question:   
 
Corollary 2.  The negatively distorting effects of income taxation, including income and 
consumption taxes, on the balanced-growth rate are more pronounced in an economy that is 
dominated by a powerful trade union when it is employment-oriented.     
Proof: Differentiating ( τ γ ∂ ∂ / ~ ) and ( c τ γ ∂ ∂ / ~ ) with respect to  θ , we have: 
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< .  Note that, to isolate the effects, when we 
derive the impact of unionization on the distorting effect of income tax, i.e.  θ τ γ / ) / ~ ( ∂ ∂ ∂ , the 
analysis is assumed to start with a zero consumption tax (i.e.  0 = c τ  initially).  By analogy, 
the assumption that  0 = τ   is initially made when we derive  θ τ γ / ) / ~ ( c ∂ ∂ ∂ .   
We can bluntly provide the intuition behind Corollary 2 though it is somewhat complex.  
Proposition 3 indicates that taxation (income and consumption taxes) gives rise to a negatively 
distorting effect on the reduction in employment and, thus, the balanced-growth rate follows.  
On the other hand, as shown in Proposition 2, when the union is employment-oriented  δ > v , 
unionization (a higher  θ ) will result in a higher employment level.    Given the higher level of   17
employment, the balanced-growth rate becomes more sensitive to taxes.  In other words, 
under  δ > v , a stronger bargaining power of the union has a greater marginal effect in terms 
of affecting the tax distortion.  Thus, the distorting effect of taxation on economic growth is 
reinforced by unionization and, as a result, becomes more pronounced in an economy that is 
dominated by a powerful trade union.  A similar type of logic applies to the case where 
δ < v .   
 
4.2 Welfare analysis   
In this sub-section, we attempt to study the impact of unionization on social  welfare.  In 
line with the common approach, an appropriate level of welfare is the utility obtained by the 
representative household.  Given the balanced-growth rate γ% , we have:  0 ()
t kt ke
γ =




% % , and  00 cx k = ⋅ %  (due to  / x ck = ).  With this information, computing the utility 
obtained by means of the integral in (6) is straightforward, and yields the following (aside 














.             ( 2 4 )  
Based on condition B, the condition (1 ) σ γρ − < %  guarantees that the social welfare is 
bounded.   
Given the welfare function (24), we establish Proposition 4 as follows: 
 
Proposition 4.  Given that the equilibrium is locally determinate, i.e.  0 D > , a higher 
bargaining power θ  has a positive (negative) effect on the social welfare if the union is 
employment-oriented  δ > v  (wage-oriented  δ < v ).  That is, if the union is more 
democratic, unionization will more likely harm the social welfare.   
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(23).  Since  sgn( θ l )=sgn( δ − v ) is true, (25) can thus be re-expressed as: 
 
11
0 (1 ) [1 (1 ) ]
0
(1 ) (1 )
Wk x A l A l l
D
σσ β β
θ βτ α τ α
σ
θρ σ γσ ρ σ γ
−− − ⎧⎫ ∂− − − ≥ =+ ⎨⎬ < ∂− − − − ⎩⎭
% % %
%%
; iff  v δ ≥
< .  
As noted earlier, when the trade union is wage-oriented, its stronger bargaining power will   18
result in a lower consumption-capital ratio and rate of growth.    As a result, the social welfare 
will be reduced as well.  Although the reasoning behind this result is straightforward, 
somewhat surprisingly, if the union is more democratic and more aggressively extracts higher 
wages from firms, unionization will have a negative effect on welfare.   
 
5. Concluding Remarks   
In most of the economics literature, the function of a trade union, in line with the 
argument of Dunlop (1994), is to rationally maximize “something,” say, either a utilitarian 
objective function or an expected utility function.  In this paper, we instead follow Ross 
(1948) and incorporate a so-called political trade union into the endogenous growth model.  
By borrowing from Pemberton’s (1988) managerial model, we show that the conflicting 
interests between the leadership and membership within the union play a decisive role in the 
unemployment, growth and welfare effects of unionization.  A higher degree of unionization 
will result in a lower unemployment rate and a higher balanced-growth rate if the union is 
employment-oriented.  However, when the union is wage-oriented, an opposite result 
emerges: unionization becomes harmful to both unemployment and growth.  These results 
also lead us to conclude that a higher degree of unionization has a positive (negative) effect on 
the social welfare if the union is employment-oriented (wage-oriented).   This implies that, 
somewhat surprisingly, when the union is more democratic and more aggressively extracts 
higher wages from firms, unionization instead gives rise to a negative effect on welfare. 
Since taxation, besides unions, is another potential candidate in terms of explaining the 
poor performance of employment and economic growth, we also re-examine the taxation 
effects within a growth model with equilibrium unemployment.    It is found that the results of 
incorporating taxation into our unemployment growth model are somewhat different from 
those for the traditional full-employment growth model.  In addition, this paper also shows 
that equilibrium unemployment and distortionary taxes jointly create a mechanism that results 
in equilibrium indeterminacy, in which the union’s internal conflicting interests regarding 
employment and wages play a significant role.         19
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Figure 1: The Existence of the Balanced-Growth Path 
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